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On the Go¨del’s formula
Jailton C. Ferreira
Abstract
The proof of Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem includes the construction of an arithmetic
formula G that represents the metamathematical statement: the formula G is not provable.
This article examines the formula G (of Go¨del). We demonstrated that the Go¨del’s number
of the formula G is not a finite number if (i) G is comprehended as a self-referential statement
or (ii) there is an infinite set S of well formed formulae with one free variable such that the
elements of S are theorems or antitheorems in T.
1 Introduction
The Go¨del’s formula is frequently comprehended as a self-referential statement like
This sentence is not provable.
Let G be the name of the above sentence.
In the section 2 we show that the Go¨del’s statement can not contain its own Go¨del’s numeral.
Since in the indirect self-reference the formula refers to itself through of one or more formulae, the
conclusion for direct self-reference is extended to indirect self-reference cases when Go¨del’s number
of a formula is used as the name of the formula.
Section 3 examines the Go¨del’s formula without considering self-reference. Starting from the
diagonal theorem we conclude that if there is an infinite set S of well formed formulae with one free
variable such that the elements of S are theorems or antitheorems in T then the Go¨del’s sentence
does not exist.
2 Go¨del’s formula and self-reference
A category of names of formulae, denominated structural-descriptive names by Tarski [1],
is applied to names that describe the words that compose the denoted expression.
Go¨del’s numbering form attributes a distinctive numeral to each symbol of the alphabet of
a formal language. It possesses an effective method to map each symbol, sequence of symbols
(which can be a well formed formula) or sequence of well formed formulae (which can be proof
of a theorem) in a numeral (denominated Go¨del’s number), and it possesses an effective method
to map each Go¨del’s number in the symbol or sequences of symbols corresponding to the Go¨del’s
number.
It is evident that the Go¨del’s number of a formula is a structural-descriptive name of the
formula. The formula named G has a second name that is its Go¨del’s number. We will now build
the formula G.
Let y be the Go¨del’s number of a well formed formula with a single free variable, z
y ∆zΩ (1)
where ∆ and Ω are sequences of symbols.
Let us define the function sub(y, z, j) as being the formula obtained with the substitution, in the
formula of Go¨del’s number y, of the only free variable, z, by the number j. The sequence sub(y, z, j)
is
1
∆sss . . . s0Ω
where s means “the successor of” and there are j+1 characters in the sequence sss . . . s0. Let us
denote by g(A) the Go¨del’s number of the formula A and by pAq the sequence sss . . . s0 of g(A)+1
symbols. Let us consider the formula
¬(∃r : ∃s : (P (r, s) ∧ (s = psub(y, z, y)q)) (2)
P (r, s) is true if the sequence of symbols with Go¨del’s number r proves the formula with Go¨del’s
number s. In English (2) means: there is not a proof for the formula whose Go¨del’s numeral is
psub(y, z, y)q .
For us to derive the Go¨del’s number of (2), we substituted psub(y, z, y)q by the sequence
sss . . . s0 of g(sub(y, z, y))+1 symbols
¬(∃r : ∃s : (P (r, s) ∧ (s = sss . . . s0)) (3)
Let n be the Go¨del’s number of (2). Assuming the variable y of function sub(y, z, y) the value n,
the formula (2) changes to
¬(∃r : ∃s : (P (r, s) ∧ (s = psub(n, z, n)q)) (4)
The formula (4) is also sub(n, y, n) and its Go¨del’s number is
g(sub(n, y, n)) (5)
If we know y, then we know the corresponding formula and the position of the free variable z in
it. The character z in (2) is determined and substituted by y. In this sense the free variable in (2)
is y.
In the presentation with the name of the formula and the formula, we have
g(sub(n, y, n)) ¬(∃r : ∃s : (P (r, s) ∧ (s = psub(n, z, n)q))) (6)
name of the formula formula
The proof of Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem includes the construction of an arithmetic for-
mula G that would represent the metamathematical statement: formula G is not provable. This
formula G is in Hofstadter [2] or Nagel and Newman [3], for instance,
g(sub(n, z, n)) ¬(∃r : ∃s : (P (r, s) ∧ (s = psub(n, z, n)q))) (7)
name of the formula formula
To come to (7) the symbol z needs to be understood as the free variable in (2) and Go¨del’s number
of (4) defined by
g(sub(n, z, n))
Let us notice that
g(sub(n, z, n)) ¬(∃r : ∃s : (P (r, s) ∧ (s = psub(y, z, n)q))) (8)
name of the formula formula
is obtained if z is understood as the free variable in (2) and psub(y, z, y)q in (2) is substituted by
psub(y, z, n)q. The formula presented in (7) needs to be examined:
Theorem 2.1 The Go¨del’s number of the formula G is not a finite number.
2
Proof:
Let be the equivalent sets
{(r1, s1), (r2, s2), (r3, s3), . . . , (rk, sk)} (9)
and
{(1, 2), (3, 4), (4, 6), . . . , (2k − 1, 2k)} (10)
where ri is Go¨del’s number of the proof of the formula of Go¨del’s number si. Let’s consider that
the number of provable formulae, denoted by k, is finite. Let be now the set
{0, (1, 2), (3, 4), (4, 6), . . . , (2k − 1, 2k)} (11)
let us make correspond one-to-one to element 0 of the set given in (11) the Go¨del’s number g(G).
It is evident that, by hypothesis, G is not a provable formula (there are k provable formulas and
G is not one of them). Therefore, G can be built as
g(G) ¬(pGq = ps1q) ∧ ¬(pGq = ps2q) ∧ . . . ∧ ¬(pGq = pskq) (12)
name of the formula formula
where pskq is the Go¨del’s numeral correspondent to sk. If g(G) is finite, then just the contribution
of the first Go¨del’s numeral to count from the left in the formula in (12), for Go¨del’s number of
the formula, is greater than the name of the formula in (12). This is a contradiction. Therefore
the Go¨del’s number of the formula G is not a finite number. 
3 Go¨del’s formula and the diagonal theorem
The diagonal theorem, which is the core of Go¨del’s proof, says [4]
Theorem 3.1 For any well-formed formula (wf) D(x) with x as its only free variable, there exists
a closed formula α such that
⊢T α←→ D(pαq) (13)
The formula D(x) used in Go¨del’s proof is
D(s) = (∀r)¬P (r, s) (14)
Substituting (14) in (13) we obtain
⊢T G(x)←→ (∀r)¬P (r, pG(x)q) (15)
Let
S = {s1, s2, s3, . . . , sk, . . .} (16)
be the set of all well formed formulas with one free variable that are theorems or antitheorems in
T. The set S is not finite. We can construct the following sequence of symbols, denoted by γ,
¬(pZq = ps1q) ∧ ¬(pZq = ps2q) ∧ . . . ∧ ¬(pZq = pskq) ∧ . . . (17)
Let be the Go¨del’s numerals of γ substituted by the correspondent sequences of sss . . . s0.
The sequence γ says with symbols of the list of symbols of T that Z(x) is not provable. There are
infinite symbols in γ and there is no way to express what γ says with a number finite of symbols.
Therefore the formula
(∀r)¬P (r, pG(x)q) (18)
has not a Go¨del’s number (the number obtained is not finite) and it is not a well formed formula.
With this we proved the following theorem:
Theorem 3.2 If there is an infinite set S of well formed formulae with one free variable such that
the elements of S are theorems or antitheorems in T, then the Go¨del’s sentence does not exist.
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